摘要Summary

Comprehensive security as a strategic approach

This strategy follows the principle of comprehensive security. It serves as an overarching strategy for the authorities, addressing all areas relevant to security policy. It incorporates all aspects of foreign, domestic, and economic policy relevant to security policy into its planning and measures. Comprehensive security is achieved through the cooperation of all relevant actors within the framework of a common strategy. This requires the involvement of all government levels – federal, cantonal, and municipal – as well as all areas of society, namely politics, business, academia, and civil society. In addition, the Security Policy Strategy 2026 serves as an orientation for international partners.

Unlike the previous concept of total defence, which characterised Switzerland’s security policy during the Cold War, comprehensive security also includes international cooperation, as most threats are transnational. This comprehensive approach must not only be implemented in armed conflict. It must also serve to ward off current threats and prepare for future ones. This combined effort makes Switzerland resilient, capable of resistance, and able to defend itself.

3 strategic directions, 10 objectives, 45 measures

The security policy strategy pursues three strategic directions:

First, resilience must be strengthened. Vulnerabilities and critical dependencies must be reduced to the greatest extent possible so that Switzerland offers less scope for attack and potential damage is minimised. This should also reduce the likelihood of threats and dangers occurring in the first place. Six objectives and 18 measures have been formulated for the implementation of this first strategic direction.

Second, the protection of the population from risks must be improved, as must internal security. Switzerland must be better able to prevent or repel potential and actual attacks and better protect itself against their effects. Two objectives and 15 measures have been formulated for the implementation of this second strategic direction.

Third, it is a matter of strengthening defence capabilities. Switzerland should be able to defend itself as independently as possible against an armed attack. In the event of an armed attack, defence in cooperation should be possible, which must be prepared. Two objectives and 12 measures have been formulated for the implementation of this third strategic direction.

These three strategic directions are being pursued in parallel and prepare Switzerland against potential escalations: from periods of heightened tension to various types of escalation, up to and including an armed attack.

Figure 1: Overview of the elements of the Security Policy Strategy 2026.

Measures and implementation

For each objective of the security policy strategy, leading departments and other involved bodies are defined. Existing responsibilities are thus taken into account. In addition to the responsible federal agencies, other relevant actors from the federal and cantonal levels, the private sector, academia, associations and the public will be involved where appropriate.

Effective implementation of the measures is only possible through the coordinated deployment of the various security policy actors and resources. Therefore, overarching steering and regular monitoring of progress are essential. For this purpose, the DDPS, with the State Secretariat for Security Policy (SEPOS), leads an interdepartmental steering committee. This improves the overview and coherence of all measures and helps identify interdependencies.

Threats and risks in the environment

The simultaneity and combination of external and internal threats, from state actors, terrorist groups, and radicalised individuals, from manipulation and disinformation to espionage and sabotage, and even military force, necessitate a comprehensive security policy response.

For decades, Switzerland has been spared major power struggles and benefited from a largely stable environment. That has changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine marks a watershed moment in security policy, the effects of which Switzerland is also feeling directly. Switzerland’s security is facing greater and more diverse threats today than it has seen for decades. If Switzerland wants to protect its territory, its population, its values, and its interests, it must invest in its security.

Several developments are weakening the international order. Russia is clinging to its claim to a sphere of influence. It is orienting its economy toward war and its armed forces toward a possible confrontation with Western states. There is a risk of escalation into a war between Russia and NATO member states. China is asserting itself more strongly as a global actor and is pursuing clear political, economic, and territorial goals. It is expanding its military capabilities and strengthening its regional and global influence.

Apart from the war in Ukraine, the rivalry between the United States and China is the most significant development for security policy. Both countries see economic and military strength as the best means to achieve their goals. The United States remains the leader in military and economic power. However, it is increasingly unwilling to fulfil its traditional role as guarantor of the world order.

As a result of this new power politics, international relations are once again determined more strongly by individual states and shifting, more informal coalitions. International law is harder to enforce and reaching consensus in international institutions is increasingly difficult. The world is becoming more fragmented and unstable. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are becoming politically, economically, and militarily interconnected. Russia has repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. The incentive for nuclear proliferation is increasing.

New forms and means of confrontation are shaping international relations and the battlefield. Global interconnectedness and the international division of labour create prosperity but also entail risks. Major powers use such relationships of dependence as leverage for their political, economic, technological, and military objectives. States affected by this attempt to reduce their vulnerabilities.

The hybrid conduct of conflict – a combination of various means employed by a state aggressor to destabilise another state, undermine its institutions, or impose its will on it – encompasses the entire spectrum of exerting pressure, including up to the threat and use of military force. As this occurs in a grey area of international law, it is difficult for defenders to recognise and repel threats early on.

Like previous wars, the war in Ukraine is a catalyst for the military application of new technologies, the integration of new technologies into existing weapons systems, and their continuous adaptation. Artificial intelligence (AI), for example, is developing into a key technology for modern armed forces and will influence many military capabilities in the future.

Threats to domestic security

Influence activities and disinformation, as part of a hybrid conduct of conflict, directly aim at dividing societies and can affect election and voting results in democracies. Political polarisation endangers consensus-building, social cohesion, and thus political stability.

Jihadist-motivated terrorism and violent extremism have been serious threats for years. Online propaganda intensifies the radicalisation of potential, especially under-age, lone perpetrators.

Organised crime is increasing significantly in Europe and also in Switzerland. It includes drug and arms trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime.

Climate change exacerbates and accelerates existing political, social, environmental, and economic problems. The risk of renewed pandemics remains. Migration movements can also have implications relevant to security policy.

Characteristics and vulnerabilities of Switzerland

Federalism and direct democracy are designed to prevent the concentration of power and increase the legitimacy of decisions. However, they also involve vulnerabilities. As an example, polarisation within the society can be intensified through targeted disinformation and propaganda. Switzerland can best safeguard its security policy interests in a world where power is limited by law. However, these values are under pressure globally. Failure to respect them poses a threat to Switzerland’s security and stability.

Switzerland’s neutrality is an instrument of security and foreign policy. It has always been developed in response to current challenges. The rejection of requests for the re-export of military equipment to Ukraine weakens the international competitiveness of the Swiss arms industry. Its performance, in turn, is crucial for the armed forces’ defence capabilities.

Switzerland has a strong, internationally integrated economy. This interconnectedness is a source of Switzerland’s prosperity, but it also makes it dependent on the import of goods, raw materials, high-tech components, and energy sources, as well as a reliable trade order. Fundamentally, there is growing pressure on Switzerland to take a political stance regarding certain economic sectors, goods and technologies vis-à-vis major powers and economic blocs to maintain access to markets and supply chains.

With its internationally recognised universities and research institutions, Switzerland is a major technology hub. Research and expertise within universities and companies, as well as the numerous international organisations based in Switzerland, are attractive targets for espionage and sabotage. Switzerland has numerous infrastructures that are essential for the functioning of the economy and society, not only within Switzerland but also for its neighbours, other countries, and international actors. Disruptions and outages of these can affect the whole of Europe.

European states bordering Russia, as well as NATO and the European Union as a whole, take the threat posed by Russia very seriously. NATO member states are increasing their defence spending substantially. Formats of security cooperation have expanded significantly in recent years, offering Switzerland new opportunities. Switzerland benefits from the security policy commitment of the EU, NATO and its European neighbours. However, to avoid a one-sided relationship, Switzerland must also contribute.

A comprehensive, armed, and direct attack on Switzerland is unlikely in the foreseeable future – thanks in part to the defence and security efforts of NATO and Europe. Such an attack could, however, also be carried out with long-range weapons. The situation can change very rapidly, yet the resources required for defence need years of preparation.

From 2028 onward, a window of vulnerability could emerge for Europe: By then, Europe will not yet have fully developed its own defence capabilities and will no longer be able to rely completely on support from the US, while Russia will have continued to ramp up its war economy. During this phase, Russia could intensify hybrid actions and attack further states in Europe.