導論Introduction

The world has become more dangerous

For decades, Switzerland was spared major power struggles and benefited from a largely stable environment. That has changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine marks a watershed moment in security policy, the effects of which Switzerland is also feeling directly. Switzerland’s security is facing greater and more diverse threats today than it has seen for decades. Correspondingly, the pressure on security policy is high. Security policy aims to preserve a free, independent, and secure Switzerland and to promote a peaceful and just international order.¹ The watershed moment in Europe shows that if Switzerland wants to protect its territory, its population, its values, and its interests, it must invest in its security.

War again in Europe

Various developments for great importance are changing Switzerland’s security policy environment. Russia’s war against Ukraine is being waged with an intensity that Europe has not experienced since the Second World War. It shows how armed conflicts can develop. In addition, the hybrid conduct of conflict is increasing, for example by means of disinformation, cyberattacks and acts of sabotage. The interconnectedness of the economy and of critical infrastructures as well as technological development increase dependencies. The willingness to use such dependencies for power politics has increased. Civilian and military means are therefore closely intertwined, as are internal and external security. The geographical distance to crises and conflicts is becoming less important.

International relations, including in the economic sphere, are more strongly influenced by power politics. International law is questioned or even broken. More and more states are threatening or using force to pursue their interests and ambitions. Great powers speak publicly about using military means to conquer territories or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Some autocratic states are working increasingly closely together politically, economically and militarily.

Finally, democracies are also coming under pressure from within: polarisation and a willingness to use violence have increased – in part also due to external influence. Terrorism and violent extremism remain persistent threats. Organised crime activities have increased considerably. The consequences of climate change are becoming more visible, for example in the form of natural disasters; as well as technology- and society-related risks, as the Covid-19 pandemic showed.

Russia is increasingly provoking with sabotage actions and airspace violations. The United States’ security and foreign policy have been changing since the new administration took office in 2025. A reduction of the commitment of the US and its armed forces in Europe must be expected. NATO, the European Union and most of their member states are therefore committed to strengthening Europe’s independent defence capability.

A comprehensive, armed and direct attack on Switzerland is unlikely in the foreseeable future – also thanks to the defence and security efforts of NATO and Europe. However, such an attack can also be carried out with long-range weapons. The ranges and precision of drones, ballistic guided missiles, cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons are increasing, while the warning times are decreasing. The situation can change rapidly, yet the required means for defence require many years of preparation.

In any case, the risk of a military conflict in the closer European vicinity with direct consequences for Switzerland has increased considerably. With Russia’s attack on Ukraine, its claim to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and uncertainty regarding the United States’ security guarantees, the likelihood of a confrontation between Russia and NATO has increased.

These developments are the starting point for the present security policy strategy for Switzerland. The probability of certain scenarios is difficult to determine – especially since the situation is very volatile, as recent years have shown. A security policy strategy must continue to assume an escalating situation and align its precautions accordingly. This is more urgent given that Switzerland’s security apparatus is currently insufficiently prepared for resisting hybrid attacks as well as for defence. In view of the developments in the surrounding environment, the European and global situation could change in such a way that a fundamental review of Switzerland’s security and defence policy might become necessary.

Comprehensive security

Switzerland is confronted with a simultaneity of internal and external threats – whether from state actors, terrorist groups or radicalised individuals, disinformation and sabotage or military force. Therefore, a comprehensive security policy response is needed. That is why this strategy follows the approach of comprehensive security.

The development in Switzerland’s environment and its internal organisation require and enable a comprehensive approach. Due to its federal structure, security depends on close cooperation between state, civil society and private actors, between the Confederation, cantons and municipalities, civilian and military organisations and the involvement of the entire population. Switzerland’s security policy can draw on various means, from intelligence, cyber defence, police and border security to the armed forces and civil protection to foreign policy and economic measures such as national economic supply.

To this end, Switzerland must cooperate with its neighbours and partners. For example, the protection of the population against technical or natural hazards is greater and the fight against terrorism and crime more effective if they take place across borders and when Switzerland can benefit from the capabilities of others and develop its own. Finally, an armed attack requires a strong defence, both independently and in cooperation.

The development of Swiss security policy

After the end of the Cold War, Switzerland intensified its international efforts to promote peace. Like other European countries, it continuously reduced the armed forces’ resources and focused on subsidiary operations for civilian authorities. The defence capability was reduced, and civil protection was no longer a priority.

However, the Federal Council had already pointed out the limits of Switzerland’s autonomous defence capability in the 1993 Neutrality Report. Especially in the field of air defence and in view of technological changes, Switzerland could be compelled to focus its security and defence policy more strongly on cooperation with other countries. The report argued that such cooperation, within certain limits, is compatible with the sense and spirit of neutrality – all the more so since a neutral state is obliged to take military precautions to successfully defend himself against attacks.²

The Security Policy Report 2000³ conceptually underpinned this orientation and stated that domestic cooperation between security policy instruments and levels of government should be supplemented by increased international cooperation. In particular, Switzerland strengthened police cooperation and became an associate member of the Schengen area. The Security Policy Report 2010⁴ also emphasised the challenges of internal security.

Following the impression of a deterioration in the security situation in Europe, especially since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the Federal Council in 2016 refocused Switzerland’s security policy⁵ more strongly on threats by power politics. The Security Policy Report 2021⁶ particularly dealt with the hybrid conduct of conflict. Russia’s open military attack on Ukraine in February 2022 prompted Switzerland to step up defence efforts and intensify international cooperation. This was the conclusion of the supplementary report to the Security Policy Report 2021 of September 2022⁷. It reaffirmed Switzerland’s intention to defend itself as independently as possible as a neutral state, while at the same time to create the conditions to be able to do so jointly with other states, if necessary, in the event of an armed attack.

In the summer of 2023, the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport set up a study commission in response to these developments. It was intended to provide impetus for the present security policy strategy from an outside perspective and with broad expertise. In August 2024, the Commission presented its study report⁸ with over 100 recommendations, including adjustments to the neutrality policy, far-reaching defence cooperation with foreign partners, an increase of the defence budget to 1% of the gross domestic product by 2030, and other measures to strengthen social and economic resilience. Many of these considerations have been incorporated into this strategy; others are the subject of ongoing debates or have been rejected by political decisions.

The status of Switzerland’s Security Policy Strategy 2026

Switzerland’s Security Policy Strategy 2026 is based on these foundations and takes into account new developments. In the spirit of comprehensive security, it focuses on strengthening resilience, resistance and protection, and increasing defence capability: three strategic directions that correspond to the worsening of the situation. These strategic directions contain a total of ten objectives, for the achievement of which 45 concrete measures have been formulated.

The security policy strategy 2026 serves as a framework for the national and cantonal authorities to implement security policy and to organise their respective resources. The strategy is aimed at the Confederation, cantons and municipalities as well as stakeholders from society, the economy, science and politics, so that these can contribute to the implementation of the strategy. In addition, it serves as an orientation for partners abroad.

The security policy strategy 2026 thus represents the umbrella strategy that addresses all areas relevant to security policy. It is aligned with the Foreign Policy Strategy 2024-2027⁹ and the Foreign Economic Policy Strategy¹⁰. Related thematic or sectoral sub-strategies, plans and reports are subordinate to these strategies.

Figure 2: Conceptual order of strategies and reports (non-exhaustive presentation).

Their implementation requires overarching steering and continuous monitoring of progress. The DDPS is to ensure this with the State Secretariat for Security Policy.

With the adoption of the strategy, the Federal Council is responding to several parliamentary initiatives:

• Motion 22.3726 by National Councillor Rechsteiner, which calls for an overarching strategy on security and defence, in particular on the interaction and coordination between the various actors and policy areas;
• Postulate 22.3308 Gredig, according to which the Federal Council should examine and report on Switzerland’s participation in European and international programmes and cooperation projects;
• Motion 24.4036 Z’graggen, which calls for concrete measures for social, economic and military resilience and defence capability in a strategy;
• Postulate 25.3264 Roth, according to which the Federal Council should set out the measures to reduce Switzerland’s security dependence on the United States and strengthen cooperation with European states and the European Union in the field of security policy.

The security policy strategy will regularly be reviewed and resubmitted if changes in the situation suggest it. A report on the status of implementation will be submitted to the Federal Council by the end of 2028.