瑞士：特性與脆弱之處Switzerland: characteristics and vulnerabilities

Federalism and direct democracy

Switzerland is organised in a decentralised manner. Its political structure is designed to avoid concentration of power. Federalism and subsidiarity enable and promote locally and regionally anchored solutions. Direct democracy increases the legitimacy of decisions. The collegial system of government reduces the importance of individuals or parties. This means that the political system is not geared towards quick or radical decisions but is characterised by consultations and consensus-building. In addition, there is the militia system in the armed forces, civil defence, alternative civilian service, fire brigade, associations and a large part of the political authorities. It strengthens the connection between the population, these organisations and political institutions.

Free political debate and cooperation between the federal government, cantons and municipalities are therefore of fundamental importance, also for Switzerland’s security. They promote political participation, social cohesion, a sense of democratic responsibility and thus resilience.

However, the direct participation of all citizens in the community and federally organised internal security also offer scope for attack. For example, targeted disinformation and propaganda can increase polarisation within society. Democratic consensus-building and trust in democratic processes, the state and the media could be undermined.

Rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law

Switzerland can best protect its security policy interests in a world in which power is limited by law. Its contributions to peace and stability, sustainable development and international law are still in demand.¹³ Its commitment is aimed at refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter and respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, human rights and international humanitarian law.

However, these values are under pressure globally. At a time when the number and extent of armed conflicts have increased, the respect for them is of particular importance and corresponds to the interests and values of Switzerland and those of its European partner states.

Neutrality

Switzerland’s neutrality is an instrument of security and foreign policy that historically arose in the context of intra-European conflicts and peace settlements. It has always been developed according to the prevailing challenges.¹⁴ The objective of neutrality was to contribute to Switzerland’s predictability and to serve the interests of Switzerland and its neighbours. It was intended to prevent Switzerland from becoming directly involved in armed conflicts on the European continent. Neutrality contributes to the credibility of Switzerland’s humanitarian commitment and “good offices”.¹⁵ Neutrality also has an identity-forming effect for the Swiss population.

The law of neutrality, which is anchored in international law, represents the indispensable core of neutrality. It imposes obligations in the event of an international armed conflict. Neutral states may not join a military alliance with mutual assistance obligations or provide military support to warring states. Nor may they supply weapons from their own armed forces’ stocks to warring parties, and they must uphold equal treatment for private exports of military goods.

If Switzerland considers itself under armed attack, it may cooperate with other states for its defence. However, the question of when a country is to be considered as attacked, which is decisive for the application of neutrality, has become more difficult with the hybrid conduct of conflict (see text box pp. 33-35). To support broad-based international sanctions is also possible under neutrality law and in Switzerland’s interest.

Within the legal framework, Switzerland develops its neutrality in a manner allows it to best serve its security and foreign policy interests. This room for manoeuvre is crucial to safeguarding Switzerland’s interests.

Armed neutrality requires certain military capacities and resources: The aim of armed neutrality is that the neutral state can credibly enforce its neutrality. This need is exacerbated by the fact that neutral states cannot rely on burden-sharing, which is typical of a military alliance. Armed neutrality therefore requires all the more investment in one’s own defence.

Today, various European countries are questioning whether Switzerland’s neutrality also serves stability in Europe.¹⁶ In particular, the rejection of requests for the re-export of war materiel of Swiss origin to Ukraine, which was linked to neutrality, led to criticism from partner states in security policy.¹⁷ A first concrete consequence is the exclusion of the Swiss arms industry from many tenders and supply chains of foreign manufacturers. This weakens their ability to export and restricts their access to European armaments and technologies – at a time when armaments policy cooperation within the EU is being reinforced. A weakening of the arms industry is also detrimental to Switzerland’s defence capability. In addition, the high demand on the arms markets in general is currently meeting a limited supply, which delays procurements and makes them more expensive.

Fundamentally, there is increasing pressure on Switzerland to take a political position vis-à-vis major powers and economic blocs in certain sectors of the economy, goods and technologies in order to maintain access to research, technologies, markets and supply chains. And Switzerland is expected to contribute to the effectiveness of sanctions regimes and combat their circumvention – also beyond the war in Ukraine.

Mobile society and internationalised economy

The mobility of society and the economy have increased. Switzerland has a strong, internationally integrated economy and a leading global financial centre. This interconnectedness is a source of Switzerland’s prosperity, but it also makes it vulnerable. Switzerland is dependent on the import of goods, raw materials, high-tech components and energy sources. Imports take place via complex supply chains and widely branched transport routes. Blockades quickly have a significant impact on these global supply chains. Access to markets or technologies can be made more difficult, more expensive or impossible by geopolitical upheavals and unilateral regulations. Hence a majority of Swiss companies and banks consider geopolitical risks to be very relevant to their business activities.¹⁸

In addition, Switzerland relies on a reliable trade order, especially since its economic success in recent decades has been largely based on this stability. It is in Switzerland’s interest to have the same legal regulations and framework conditions as its most important trading partners – especially if they have been democratically constituted, are guaranteed by the rule of law and are relevant to security policy. Secure market access to the EU and other important markets is therefore essential, as are export controls that mitigate proliferation risks. Proliferation risks include the interest of other states in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and other armaments programmes through illegal procurement in Switzerland. Third countries could also take countermeasures against Switzerland if relevant goods, technologies and know-how flow out of Switzerland.

Important hub for research, technologies, and international organisations

With its internationally recognised universities and research institutions, Switzerland is an important technology hub. The protection of intellectual property and knowledge security are key concerns and political priorities for Switzerland. The research and know-how in universities and companies are attractive targets for espionage and sabotage. Such activities are primarily aimed at militarily relevant dual-use technologies, which are subject to export controls. Security-relevant research results, for example in the field of artificial intelligence, can reach other countries via foreign researchers or espionage, strengthening these countries’ security-related capabilities that could possibly be used against Switzerland or its partners. The consequence of inadequate protective measures would also weaken Switzerland as a science and business hub: through reputational damage or even coercive measures, for example by restricting access to the latest technologies such as advanced semiconductors or research funding programmes.

Switzerland is home to numerous international organisations. Geneva is home to 184 state representations, 40 international organisations and over 450 non-governmental organisations. These are targets for espionage, more and more often also for cyberattacks, and possible targets of terrorist attacks. Since other states may also be affected, they could strengthen their counterintelligence in Switzerland if Switzerland does not itself take sufficient action against espionage.

Node in Europe

Switzerland has numerous infrastructures that are essential for the functioning of the economy and society of Switzerland, but also of its neighbours, other countries and international actors. Switzerland plays an important role in the exchange of electricity and gas between European Union countries, as a hub for rail, road and air transport, as one of the world’s leading financial centres and as a transit country for international data connections. Thus, it presents a significant target for attack. Disruptions or failures of these infrastructures can affect the whole of Europe. A combination of events or a chain reaction of events can lead to supply bottlenecks and shortages in Switzerland and its neighbouring countries. Critical infrastructures can be attacked by cyber means, sabotage actions or, in extreme cases, with long-range weapons, with the intention of hitting not only Switzerland but also other states, alliances or institutions.

Part of European security

Switzerland is surrounded by EU and NATO member states. European states on the border with Russia, but also NATO and the EU as a whole, take the threat from Russia very seriously and are massively increasing their defence spending. In response to the changed security situation, Finland joined NATO in 2023 and Sweden in 2024. The EU supports its member states in developing their defence capabilities and defence industries. Joint procurements shall be made easier and faster. Europe is also increasing its support for Ukraine. The security policy effort in Europe is partly carried out in flexible cooperation formats, depending on the unity and determination of the various European countries.¹⁹

Switzerland’s security is linked to its neighbours’ stability and benefits from their commitments in security. It is therefore in Switzerland’s interest to contribute to it. The new formats of security cooperation offer new opportunities for Switzerland. By making effective contributions to Europe’s security, it can show solidarity, which can be of use in security and foreign policy crises. Through international cooperation in security policy with European states and organisations, it also strengthens its own defence capability. As a non-member of the EU and the European Economic Area, however, not all formats are accessible to Switzerland. Switzerland is also closely involved in European cooperation through its Schengen membership, where it contributes to common internal security and benefits through the exchange of information and data for its own fight against cross-border crime.